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Accommodating Power: the `Common Sense' of Regulators

Queen's University, Canada

This article examines the perspectives, strategies and practical `common sense' of those charged with regulating and enforcing securities laws in the post-Enron era. It argues that crackdown periods following stock market disasters disrupt dominant patterns of governance and empower regulators to proactively enforce laws against powerful financial actors. The article shows how officials negotiate their regulatory terrain and accommodate the economic and social capital of the `stakeholders' they are charged with regulating outside crisis periods and how they re-interpret and redefine their mission in response to political, economic and ideological change. Empirically the article is based on 21 interviews with regulators and enforcement staff in securities commissions and law enforcement, and on the discourses and directives found in key regulatory documents.

Key Words: corporate crime • governance • habitus • regulation • stock market fraud

Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 179-197 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0964663909103634


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